#SudanRevolts: Why Now?

I’ve written a number of posts in the last month or so, for UN Dispatch, about the protests in Khartoum and elsewhere in Sudan. The protests were sparked by the announcement of austerity measures by the ruling National Congress Party in June, and were instigated by female students at the University of Khartoum. The protestors, however, are demanding the withdraw of the ruling regime and a new democratic system in which civil and political rights for all of Sudan’s diverse population will be respected. (See Girifna’s website and the Sudan Revolts website for an idea of what the protests are about.) The protests have also since gained the support of wider communities and professional associations such as the Sudanese Doctors’ Union and the Attorneys’ Bar, not to mention support from the diaspora and from around the world.

My contribution to the #SudanRevolts international support campaign

In the comments section of a post I wrote called “What Role for Celebrity Activists in #SudanRevolts?“, @fariniamujica left the following comment:

Carol I loved this! I think its really helpful for all us “non-Sudanese” on how to support. I was wondering if you could help me answer a question/comment I’ve seen around by some foreigners regarding the situation in Sudan: “NOW they protest because of rise in prices? Where were they when the genocide was going on?” I think you and me obviously know that this is not why they are protesting, but I also believe that up to a certain point this is why international support has been light…? I am probably wrong but I just wanted to know what you’re thoughts were on this. Thank you!!!

I responded, but there appears to be a glitch on the back end of the UN Dispatch platform and it doesn’t show up on the webpage. While that’s being worked out, I thought I’d convert my brief response into a blog post:

I’ve seen that sentiment once or twice on Twitter, yes. What I would say first is that I think it’s important to remember that a lot of these protestors are and have been opposed to the wars on the border, with the south, in Darfur, and in the east for a long time. It would be better to ask some Sudanese activists themselves, as I cannot speak for them, but my hunch is that it’s a matter of power and feasibility.

For example, you might ask an American why there are no mass protests over our continued attacks on Waziristan. It’s too far removed; it doesn’t affect your every day existence in the United States. In addition, the military is simply too powerful. You might be opposed to it, but it’s hard to imagine massive protests in the streets calling for the overthrow of the government because of it. But raise the cost of living, make good college educations tantamount to lifetimes of debt, turn a blind eye to (and participate in) corrupt banking and law-making practices, and you get Occupy Wall Street. Those may be unfair comparisons, and I’m aware of the ways in which they’re unfair, but it’s the best I can do to ellicit some form of empathy for the protestors and an explanation of sorts as to “why now” — now that austerity measures were announced.

I also don’t know the extent to which Sudanese in the north were writing about or protesting these wars in recent years, or the extent to which they would have even been able to. It’s easy to imagine any journalist writing with an anti-war slant being locked up or somehow silenced. So, although I can’t say for sure, I don’t think it’s fair to say that northern Sudanese have been apathetic or complicit in those wars over the years.

Map from 2007 showing roughly the different regions of Sudan. According to the key on the original map, Blue is Sudan, Green is Darfur, Red is South Sudan, and the Purple are “disputed areas” as of 2007. For those interested in Abyei in particular, please see comments section below for a discussion of where Abyei figures on this map, as well as links to more useful Small Arms Survey maps that document the status of Abyei. (Wikimedia Commons)

I’m not sure why international attention has been light, but I have a couple of thoughts. In one sense, the nature of the conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan is quite different from #SudanRevolts. War in Africa, particularly if there is a clear ethnic or religious ideological rhetoric being used to perpetuate it, is an easy narrative for outsiders to reproduce (even if it does overlook the inaccuracies of that narrative), and an easy story with which to appeal to readers’ emotions. I considered the possibility that the nature of the civil war with the south and the conflict in Darfur, with acts of genocide and aerial bombardments of villages, for example, was simply more dramatic and severe than the political protests and detentions that characterize #SudanRevolts. (Sexual violence, too, seems to be a hotter story if it’s a “weapon of war” than if it’s part of political repression.) Since #SudanRevolts is being repressed by what Mamdani calls the “normal violence of the state” as opposed to a genocidal mission (Saviors and Survivors, p. 281), it does not command the same kind of attention.

One of the #SudanRevolts avatars to appear on social media sites since the protests began; a fist with the Sudanese flag imprinted on top of it

However, that doesn’t explain the relative silence on the conflict in the east. While South Sudan and Darfur have got a lot of attention over the years, in comparison, the rebellion in the east has barely been mentioned. It began in the 1990s, and there was a peace agreement in 2006. For more on the conflict in the east, you can research the main opposition movements there: the Beja Congress, the Rashaida Free Lions, and the Eastern Front.

This conflict was in the northeast of the country, a region which fits into the “Arab north” part of our Western story of Sudan. I’m guessing that the reason the war in the east didn’t generate widespread outrage and coverage is that it didn’t fit into the Arab-Islamic supremacy narrative. (Further confusing this narrative is the SPLM support of the Eastern Front. Adding to that, by the way, in the case of #SudanRevolts, is the demonstrated solidarity expressed, on platforms like Twitter, by Darfuris and Southern Sudanese for #SudanRevolts, and by northern Sudanese for those struggling in South Sudan and Darfur. This includes congratulations from northern Sudanese to South Sudan on the one year anniversary of their independence.)

Flag of Sudan at independence in 1956 (until 1970); and map until 2011. (Wikimedia Commons)

So I think perhaps the reason for international support being a bit light is twofold; 1) it’s not an armed conflict, and 2) it doesn’t fit into the dominant narrative we have of Sudan. My feeling is that it’s very hard for many people, in the US for example, to alter that narrative in such a way as to be sympathetic to Sudanese in the north. Al Jazeera’s Listening Post, on an episode I was able to appear on, dealt with many of these same issues.

I think it’s probably true that the Western reaction you describe is part of why international public support and attention has been light, but I think that reaction itself comes out of a broader story we’ve been constructing about Sudan for many years now. The origins of that narrative are steeped in history and politics, and Mamdani goes into great depth in Saviors and Survivors explaining how it came to be (and what the implications are for US foreign policy toward Sudan). If you’ve read a bit about John Garang and his vision of a “New Sudan,” most of this should be making a lot of sense.

I’ll end with some recommended reading for those who want to learn more. These resources are regionally focused on Darfur (aside from the first, which focuses on South Sudan, and the next three, which focus on New Sudan and the north) because I wrote a book chapter about this topic and focused on Darfur (in New Directions in Genocide Research, ed. Adam Jones); thus these are the sources I’m familiar with. However, I highly recommend them for this particular topic. These sources do a very good job of deconstructing the dominant narratives and delving into the nuances of race, ethnicity, religion, politics, and power in Sudan.

Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence (Oneworld, 2007)

Amir Ahmad Nasr (@SudaneseThinker), “Reviving the ‘New Sudan’ vision,” Al Jazeera, January 27, 2012

Amir Ahmad Nasr, “Ending Sudan’s Identity Crisis,” The Guardian, June 10, 2011

Moez Ali, Thoughts of His Moezness (@his_moezness), “The Sudanese Identity,” February 4, 2012

Mahmoud Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (paperback by Three Rivers Press, 2010)

Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (Zed Books, 2008)

Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed and Leif Manger (eds), Understanding the Crisis in Darfur: Listening to Sudanese Voices (University of Bergen, 2006)

Julie Flint, Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur (Small Arms Survey, 2009)

R. S. O’Fahey, “Umm Kwakiyya or the Damnation of Darfur,” African Affairs, 106 (2007)

Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, “Nomad-Sedentary Relations and the Question of Land Rights in Darfur: From Complementarity to Conflict,” in Richard Rottenburg (ed), Nomadic-Sedentary Relations and Failing State Institutions in Darfur and Kordofan (Halle: Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte 26; Mitteilungen des SFB, Differenz und Integration 12)

About Carol Jean Gallo

PhD student at Cambridge. Interested in local context and global affairs and the crossroads and misinterpretations between them.
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9 Responses to #SudanRevolts: Why Now?

  1. ian says:

    Just a few things….

    -I don’t think any part of Abyei went to the South. The parts that were “lost” due to PCA ruling have just become de facto parts of SKS, much to the annoyance of the ROSS (this includes the areas around Heglig).
    -The smaller demarcated bit is the lowest blue part on the map. The part that sticks into the NW part of Unity is where Heglig is and the fighting in April (and was part of Abyei before the PCA). The little blue thumb is part of SKS and not really disputed except for Jau the northern most point of Unity state.
    – This map from Small Arms Survey is pretty good:


    -This maps shows how Abyei has changed and gotten smaller over the years:


    • Ian, thanks so much for the further clarification and the Small Arms Survey sources; very helpful! I’ve found that trying to tell the Abyei story has been a bit challenging (in other things I’ve written), not least because some sources are referring to the demarcated version and some are not. I’ll defer to you on the matter, as it seems you are much closer to the subject than I am. Thank you for taking the time to comment!

  2. @Ian: You’re totally right, but maybe it would be helpful for readers if I clarify why I got it confused. Abyei was demarcated in 2009, with parts of it going to the north and parts of it going to the south. The decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague basically whittled Abyei down to a smaller territory that’s still disputed and is supposed to have a referendum to determine whether it goes north or south (the smaller demarcated bit, I think, would be right on the border of that little blue thumb and the purple it’s poking into). That map is from 2007, so it’s a little out of date and should be counting *all* of Abyei as a “disputed area.” Because I didn’t look closely at the map, I assumed Abyei was in that middle purple bit as a disputed area.

    Looking at the maps again, I see what this map has done is it has split Southern Kordofan and, as you say, the middle purple bit is just the Nuba Mountains. I think it’s a mistake on the map-maker’s part, as in 2007, so far as I know, Abyei had not been demarcated yet and was still disputed.

    Thanks for pointing out the error, Ian! Hopefully that little explanation makes it a little clearer.

  3. ian says:

    just a small point. Abyei is not in the small purple bit. It’s the furthest south part of the blue part. the middle purple bit is just the nuba mountains. but i really liked the blog post 🙂

  4. Pingback: News: July 20th-27th, 2012 « SudanRevolts السودان ينتفض

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